If someone is generally unprepared for the undertaking, having perused a little Plato at some point, the reading of Plotinus strikes them as alien. Alien in many ways, but alien to Plato most of all. Plato seems so commonsensical, at least in the dialogues we usually read. Perhaps we give a few apologies or excuses for his more antiquated sensibilities and then set them aside. Plato the rational, dialectical, tentative philosopher, always feeling things out and providing caveats for his more speculative diversions.
Over against this stands Plotinus, woolly-headed and mystical. Gone are all those things that made Plato so deceptively digestible. Instead of an open-minded exploration, some think that in the so-called founder of Neoplatonism we find a metaphysical dogmatism opposed to Plato not only in letter but in spirit. Plotinus has been described as “Plato without Socrates”, though for some even that formula cedes too much to the continuity of the philosophers.
Time did pass. Plato’s death ca. 347 B.C. was followed by over 5 centuries before the birth of Plotinus in 204/205 A.D. That is a long time, and many calamitous and world-historical events occurred in the interim. The world was getting weird, having entered an era sometimes termed “Late Antiquity”. The usual story is that it was a world of superstition and the proliferation of cults, and that religion itself transformed by suffering a kind of inward turn. This narrative has served as well to justify the interpretation of Plotinus as the founder of a new philosophy, a more mystical, superstitious, and frankly ridiculous (in the eyes of these interpreters) outgrowth of, and ultimate break with, old-fashioned Platonism (or for those squeamish towards systems and -isms, “the reception of the teachings and writings of Plato”).
As thinkers of their time, beholden to their vastly different situations, so the argument goes, how could their philosophies as well not differ in like degree? The world changed in such and such ways, and our impressions of the two map so cleanly onto those changes. And so on.
It is not that this idea is totally wrong. But it remains superficial, and it does not penetrate into the real philosophical plane, to the domain of principles.
Beyond the literary form (dialogue versus tractate), beyond the terminology (Plotinus’ adoption of many Stoic and Aristotelian technical terms), beyond specific arguments (Plotinus’ development of arguments against Skeptics and Stoics, even deviating from those well-established Platonic arguments for, say, the soul), beyond all expressed and explicit formulations of philosophical content… There lie the Principles.
After explaining his doctrine of the three Primary Hypostases, the intelligible Principles (One, Intellect, and Soul), Plotinus gives some wide-ranging references to Plato’s dialogues and letters, and defends himself from the accusation of novelty:
And these statements of ours are not new nor even recent, but rather were made a long time ago, though not explicitly. The things we are saying now comprise exegeses of those, relying on the writings of Plato himself as evidence that these are ancient views. (5.1.8.11-14)
Strange exegesis! Plotinus neither provides a sustained, close reading of any single writing of Plato, nor does he give any evidence that he thinks such a thing ought to be done anywhere in all his writings. His references to Plato’s writings are eccentric, a phrase here, a word there, an image or paraphrase or metaphor, and yet again mere allusions. Still he considers them exegeses. He considers, I would claim, his entire written output (not to mention the life he lived) to be nothing more than such an exegesis of Plato, in other words of the true philosophy.
A leading-out, a clarification, a making-clear, a making-explicit of what has been heretofore merely implicit to varying degrees. A living-out, an unfolding, an opening-up. Philosophy thought, written, seen, and lived.
There are, it seems to me, two primary aspects to this Platonic exegesis. The first is the primacy of the Principles, and the second is the primacy of the master; these are inseparable for Plotinus.
The primacy of the Principles is the primacy of the purely intelligible over the discursive (and the sensible, corporeal, etc.). This means that discourse about the Principles is subsequent or posterior to those very Principles. This is a dogmatic point, let it be noted. The Principles ultimately cause their own expression in discourse, in written philosophy as much as in oral teaching. This is the revelatory nature of Platonism.
The primacy of the master is, perhaps, the means by which these Principles are imitated, accessed, participated. Plotinus is not so much a close reader of Plato as he is a disciple of Plato. In imitating his master, Plotinus taps into the Principles, comes close to them, and expresses them. Again, this quickly becomes dogmatic, and it must be dogmatic if the philosophy is to be true. At that point it cannot be bracketed. To bracket it would be to assume that it is false, more or less. If it is not already abundantly clear, I do not consider it false.
To avoid any misunderstanding. A critical historian will find abundant reasons why Plotinus is new. They may provide many (good) reasons for why it makes sense from a historical perspective to consider “Neoplatonism”, or whatever term, to be a good description. If one approaches history and the texts critically, this seems inevitable. And it may be history, but it is not philosophy, at least not Platonic philosophy. On some level, all such interactions between (critical) history and dogmatic philosophy will potentially incur this impasse. So be it. The both of them are circular on some level, precisely inverted, the one possessing a circular or question-begging relationship to the other. Do not cede the ground; what is primary?
This caveat and clarification being established, we can return to the question of Plotinus’ precise relationship to his master.
As a disciple, rather than a reader or commentator, Plotinus sees beyond the texts, terms, arguments, &c., to the Principles which underlie them and the proximity to which produced those concrete items. “Seeing beyond” implies here what in some contexts has been called a “spiritual” relationship, such that the master possesses truths which are not explicitly expressed and which perhaps cannot be, but whose writings and expressions are in fact hints or symbols that point to that prior domain of truth. Learning always from these symbols and hints, the disciple can establish a link to their archetypal priors.
Plotinus himself expresses it as follows, with regard to the Principles:
These, then are images; and yet they provide in a riddling manner a hint to wise interpreters of the way that god is seen. Once a wise priest has understood the riddle, he may, by coming to be in the intelligible world, make true the vision of the sanctum. (6.9.11.26-30)
This applies equally well, though in a different manner, to the relationship of master and disciple. It makes no difference that the master is not living, but has died more than 5 centuries prior to the disciple’s birth. The hints are there for all to see. As the great Plato scholar J.N. Findlay puts it, these are things which “almost anyone who has any interpretive flair must arrive at”, though I take “interpretive flair” here to stand in for this relation of philosophical discipleship rather than mere textual analysis.1 Findlay himself indicates something of the sort when he qualifies this claim with talk of the necessity of “entering into mystical feelings” and “understanding metaphysical utterances”.
Of course, Plato himself says as much in the notorious 7th Letter. The continuity is consequently unbroken. Platonism developed, of course, and many things changed. Stoic and Aristotelian terminologies were adopted, sophisticated arguments against Skepticism were developed, emphases changed. But in the matter of Principles, and of the relationship of the philosopher to those principles and the means by which they are to be accessed - in these matters, matters of eternity, we find the essential unity we had sought, and indeed the antiquity of Plotinus.
J.N. Findlay, Plato: The Written and Unwritten Doctrines, x
It should be noted that both Stoicism and Peripetetism developed out of Platonism; their founders were students of the Academy, and the concepts and ideas that they developed to Dialectic maturity (for example, the categories) are present in Platos dialogues, and most certainly were discussed in greater depth in Platos oral teachings (the "unwritten doctrines")
"Plotinus neither provides a sustained, close reading of any single writing of Plato, nor does he give any evidence that he thinks such a thing ought to be done anywhere in all his writings."
Me feeling further justified in writing philosophical essays without any references or citations